commercial intermediaries


The enforcement authorities in the United States and across the pond have been busy this week with the announcement of a major settlement in the United States, a sting operation in the United Kingdom and the extradition of a defendant from the United Kingdom to the United States.  Carolyn Lindsey of TRACE provides this update:

On March 22nd, a two count criminal information was filed against Daimler AG in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia charging the company with one count of conspiracy to falsify its books and records and one count of violating the books and records provision of the FCPA. Two days later the government filed a deferred prosecution agreement in the case. According to the criminal information, Daimler made hundreds of improper payments totaling tens of millions of dollars between 1998 and 2008 to foreign officials in Russia, China, Nigeria, Latvia, Turkey, Hungary, Greece, the Ivory Coast, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Croatia, Indonesia, Iraq, and Egypt, among other countries. Daimler is expected to pay a total of $185 million in fines and penalties, including a $93.6 million criminal fine and $91.4 million in civil penalties. In addition, the deferred prosecution agreement names former FBI Director Louis Freeh as the company’s compliance monitor. A hearing in the case is scheduled for April 1st.

On March 24th, the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom carried out dawn raids at nine locations, including five business locations and four personal residences, in a sting code named Operation Ruthenium. Three board members of Alstom’s UK subsidiaries were arrested during the raids on suspicion of bribery and corruption, conspiracy to pay bribes, money laundering and false accounting. Stephen Burgin, Robert Purcell and Alan Cledwyn Davies were released later the same day without being charged. The Serious Fraud Office stated that it is working closely with Swiss authorities to investigate allegations of overseas bribery. Alstom stated that it is cooperating with the investigation.

On March 25th, a judge ruled that Jeffrey Tessler, the British solicitor accused of laundering money and acting as a middleman in the Halliburton/KBR bribery scheme, should be extradited to the United States to stand trial. According to the indictment filed against him in the United States, Tessler funneled approximately $132 million to Nigerian officials. Tessler’s extradition needs to be approved by the British Home Secretary and, according to press reports, Tessler is planning to appeal the decision.

To read the full summaries of the Daimler, Alstom and Halliburton/KBR matters please visit the TRACE Compendium.

On February 25, 2010, the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office announced that it had brought charges against Innospec Inc.’s wholly-owned UK subsidiary, Innospec Ltd., concerning “bribery on a significant scale by Innospec and its agents in Indonesia.”  The company was charged with conspiracy to corrupt, in contravention of Section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, in connection with its sales of tetra ethyl lead (“TEL”), an anti-knock fuel additive used in oil refineries, to the Indonesian government between February 2002 and December 2006.  Innospec Ltd. is due to appear in the Southwark Crown Court on March 4, 2010.

Innospec has been under investigation by US and UK authorities for several years.  In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice began investigating the United Nations Oil for Food (“OFF”) Program activities of Innospec and its Swiss subsidiary, Alcor Chemie Vertriebs GmbH.  The investigation was subsequently expanded to include the company and its agents’ business activities involving foreign governmental entities in other countries.  The DOJ is also investigating Innospec for possible anti-trust violations related to the tetra ethyl market and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) is investigating possible sanctions violations.

Innospec and Alcor’s former agent for Iraq and other markets, Ousama M. Naaman, was indicted in August 2008 in connection with his alleged role in an eight-year conspiracy to defraud the UN OFF Program and bribe Iraqi officials in order to secure sales of the company’s chemical additives.  Naaman was arrested in Frankfurt in July 2009 and the U.S. is currently seeking his extradition.

The SFO’s investigation began in May 2008 and initially concentrated on Innospec Ltd.’s OFF activities.  Based on the SFO press release today, it appears that it has determined to concentrate its prosecution on the activities of the company and its agents in Indonesia rather than Iraq.

For a detailed summary of the Innospec investigation and other international anti-bribery enforcement actions, please visit the TRACE Compendium.

The Greek Minister of Defense has taken steps to increase transparency in its dealings with defense contractors. This summary is provided by Takis Kakouris of TRACE partner firm Zepos & Yannopoulos.

“On November 24, 2009, the Minister of Defense, Mr. Evangelos Venizelos, issued an Order to the officers and staff of the Ministry setting forth basic ethics rules to govern the contacts by armaments and defense materials companies with officers of the Ministry of National Defense and Armed Forces. The Order provides that (a) before any meeting, discussion and contact with companies, there should be a prior notification to the General Directorate of Defense Armaments and Investments (GDDAI) and, if applicable, to other competent Directorates; (b) minutes must be kept for any contact after its conclusion and a summary will be posted on the website of the Ministry; (c) any contacts of the MoD must be made with official reps of the companies and not companies acting as agents or rendering intermediary services in Greece; (d) briefing by companies for armament systems in view of the initiation of a relevant process by the Ministry may be effected only if the Order is strictly followed and provided that no internationally available solution is excluded; (e) the delegation team of the companies which are contracting counterparties or which participate in an open process or negotiation with the Ministry may consist of the lawful representatives of a company and legal or technical consultants (entitled to lawfully exercise a similar activity in Greece); and (f) the same rules apply for any contracts of the Ministry with retired officers representing (formally or informally) interests of private companies.

The Order attempts to introduce internal rules for the behavior of MoD employees when in contact or negotiating with representatives of defense companies. Although it does not constitute a statute and is binding only on the MoD staff and offices, it may affect the marketing and communications of defense companies with the MoD. We are all interested to see how this will be implemented by the Ministry as there is not yet a crystallized regulatory practice on this new Order. Clients aware of this new Order have raised several questions such as what this Order entails as to the use of commissioned sales representatives, consultants and the composition of the delegation team of tenderers, marketing efforts or negotiations for award contracts.

In practice, we do not see a dramatic change from what we knew, but this development combined with some recent prohibitions on the use of agents or consultants as stipulated by Special Terms of defense tender documents indicate a shift in the attitude of the Greek Ministry of Defense and an approach that signals an increase in transparency.”

Continuing our discussion of the importance of a meaningful due diligence process, Brady Long, VP – Compliance, Deputy General Counsel & Secretary, Pride International, Inc., describes  below some aspects of their very robust program.

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The discussion on managing intermediaries tends to center around substance – diligence, certifications, training, contracts, invoices, and monitoring/auditing. The process for accomplishing this is typically given less attention, presumably on the theory that each company is unique and should customize its roles, responsibilities and sequencing. While I generally agree with that theory, I believe there is a principle that should inform the process of managing intermediaries – a principle that is reflected in the design, administration and enforcement of my company’s intermediary management program. It is the principle that each intermediary works for the company, not the person or department that hired them. 

As a technical matter, this is true of all vendors – e.g., their contract lies with the entity, they are processed through vendor set-up, they are paid through treasury. However, vendors understandably recognize allegiances to people over organizations, and they are loyal to the employee who gives them work, not necessarily the accountant who reviews their invoices. If this loyalty goes unchecked, the consequent risks, which are numerous and well-documented, include joining a rogue employee in a bribery scheme. In terms of process, though, the critical risk is that the intermediary will be unresponsive to other compliance-related requirements – e.g., completion of training, submission to an audit. If the intermediary doesn’t “answer to” your compliance team, for instance, why should they bother responding to that team’s requests for diligence? While this risk seems to pale in comparison to the actual commission of a felony offense, it may have the effect of concealing or even perpetuating one. Deadlines for diligence, certifications, training and clarification of invoices must be met, and intermediaries understand this best when they know that they don’t just work for the employee who “feeds” them – they also work for the employees who administer the process.

We’ve communicated this principle to our intermediaries through, first, subjecting them to the prior review and approval of the Antibribery Committee. This committee consists of at least one representative of senior management in all departments and meets regularly to discuss intermediaries. Our policies require, and our employee training reiterates, that an employee who wishes to hire a proposed intermediary (the employee being internally referred to as the “sponsor”) must satisfy the committee that the intermediary shares our values. Part of that is accomplished through the “Sponsor Memorandum,” in which the employee justifies the need for the intermediary and vouches for its reputation and compliance with antibribery laws, among other things. The sponsor also participates in the committee meeting at which the intermediary is reviewed, answering questions from the committee and hearing the committee’s concerns, if any. The effect of this is to create accountability, which increases the likelihood that the sponsor will communicate that the intermediary’s contractual requirements (which include diligence, training, etc.) are not “dead letters” but, instead, represent the company’s actual expectations for the intermediary.

Further, after the intermediary has been hired, it is subject to suspension by the committee for any “red flags” that arise, in accordance with the antibribery provisions of the contract. Avoidable delays can rise to the level of a “red flag,” and this is communicated to the sponsor and the intermediary. This further sensitizes the sponsor and the intermediary to requests that arise in the intermediary management program – they are to be satisfied, not put off or even ignored.

Second, we channel requirements for diligence, certifications and training through the sponsors, in recognition of the familiarity the intermediary has with the sponsor and the likelihood that the call, letter or email will be reviewed more promptly as a result. This requires working closely with the sponsors to explain to them the need for the requirements. However, it is an aspect of “imbedding compliance in the field,” which is the ideal. Further, when approached from the perspective of quality control, it is consistent with what the sponsor may already see as his or her traditional duties – ensuring that our vendors provide goods and services that meet our high expectations.

Third, all of our sponsors (along with all management and anyone else who has approval authority) receive annual in-person antibribery training, and a portion of the training focuses on (i) the risks associated with using intermediaries; and (ii) the process through which intermediaries are vetted and, if appropriate, approved.

Fourth, whenever I travel to the field, I make it a point to meet with as many sponsors and intermediaries as possible – not only to interview the intermediaries on, and remind them of, our policies, but also to ensure that they know that the sponsor and I, as an officer of the company and as Chairman of the Antibribery Committee, require them to uphold the company’s ideals. This invariably gives rise to a dialogue on the local landscape in terms of corruption and focuses them on the risks they should be anticipating.

When conducting anti-bribery training for TRACE member companies, the most common question we hear is: how can companies persuade commercial intermediaries to participate in due diligence reviews? This is a concern for all companies, but especially for small and medium-sized companies or companies partnering with state-owned entities. These companies are often less confident about their ability to impose requirements on their third parties. Anne Richardson, Director of Member Services, offers some advice on how to overcome resistance and make the process more collaborative:

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As those in this field know well, a host of compliance “basics” make up a solid and effective anti-bribery compliance program: “tone at the top,” clear and consistent policies and procedures, reporting mechanisms, and training … training … training. Another of these essential elements, of course, is due diligence. As the majority of FCPA cases make clear, third party intermediary relationships carry a high level of risk for bribery. Not that these sales agents or distributors, who are usually small and based in developing countries, deserve all the blame when it comes to corrupt business practices – the small time intermediary making an improper payment to a foreign official in the typical FCPA case often does so at the behest, either explicit or implicit, of a large multinational. Regardless, due diligence has become a key ingredient of prudent anti-bribery compliance for companies working with intermediaries internationally. The flip side of this enforcement trend is equally potent – neither the DOJ nor SEC has brought an FCPA action against a company that had, in fact, conducted meaningful due diligence on its overseas partners. The due diligence process cannot guarantee that an intermediary will not engage in illegal business practices, but having the process in place as part of a compliance program goes a long way toward convincing prosecutors that a company takes anti-bribery compliance seriously.

Due diligence, whether done in-house or through a third party provider, can be a hard sell both within a company, particularly to local business people, and outside a company, to the distributors and agents a company seeks to put through the process. If a compliance officer thinks engaging hundreds (or thousands) of employees and agents in anti-bribery training is tough enough, imagine trying to pitch an intrusive, months-long process that may threaten to delay urgent business transactions. Despite these difficulties, however, there are some strategies and approaches that can help bring everyone on-board.

Potential intermediaries should be educated about the due diligence requirement from the outset; this is where local or regional business people play a crucial role. Candidates should be introduced to the due diligence process at the beginning of the relationship, along with the company’s anti-bribery policy and contractual certification requirements. Explaining the purpose and role of due diligence from the beginning can go a long way toward encouraging mutual transparency once the process begins. Treating the intermediary as a partner at this stage lays the groundwork for respect and accountability going forward, with all parties committing themselves to commercial transparency and appropriate business practices, — and with all parties invested in promoting the company’s reputation in the local market. Having the local marketing team deliver and reinforce the anti-bribery message and play a role in implementing the due diligence process can help establish legitimacy and credibility among the intermediaries a company is seeking to vet. In addition, clear support from the local business staff, including support in enforcing deadlines, will help ensure that intermediaries are responsive during the review process.

The message to intermediaries should assure them that they are not being singled out for due diligence and that the process does not reflect on their business ethics. Instead, due diligence reviews should be explained as a cost-effective and prudent risk-mitigation tool for companies doing business internationally. Intermediaries that are new to the company are likely to accept this more readily than those that have represented the company for many years. For the latter, an extra effort should be made to explain that a compliance program is stronger when the same policies are rolled-out worldwide, without regard to the intermediaries’ country of residence or the longevity of the relationship. When engaging intermediaries in due diligence, a professional, respectful and cordial approach can work wonders. Your company and your intermediaries are, after all, on the same side.

In the important – if not very glamorous — world of due diligence, there are still some unsettled issues.   Although we often hear debates about “whether, when and what”, we rarely hear anyone ask where.   Nancy Etzwiler of 3M’s Office of General Counsel sums the issue up nicely.
 
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“A multinational company establishing its internal anti-bribery compliance program must consider whether to centralize its review and approval process of third party due diligence, permit localized review and approval, or establish a hybrid approval structure.   A number of factors should be considered in tailoring a program to best fit the business and risk profile of a company.

 

One advantage of a centralized review process, often at corporate headquarters, may be a greater concentration of anti-bribery compliance staff, typically with more extensive experience in the scrutiny of due diligence and assessment of red flags.   Centralized review may be more appropriate for a company whose non-U.S. subsidiaries review due diligence only sporadically and do not regularly follow compliance and enforcement developments to enable it to robustly scrutinize due diligence. 

 

A centralize model may also afford greater opportunity to include senior level executives in the review process.  Senior executive presence can elevate the awareness of anti-bribery risks in an organization generally; centralized review may also offer easier access to other senior executives for consultation in difficult decisions, as well as engender faster support (and at times a more elastic budget) for internal compliance staffing or the use of outside resources when needed.  

 

Finally, centralized review also permits a company to calibrate among its global organizations the nature and amount of risk it is willing to accept, and avoid the appearance of inconsistent review standards.

 

Pitfalls of centralized review can be a lack of in-depth cultural awareness, language limitations, and difficulty in completing a review in a timely manner to meet local needs.  Local reviewers are better positioned to assess cultural aspects of due diligence such as the interviewee’s demeanor, local market conditions and practices, and typical fee structures.  Document review as well as interviews of the third parties and their references in the local language can afford more accurate assessments.  Further, unless a centralized review system ensures efficient, electronic due diligence circulation to reviewers, local assessment may be less hamstrung by frequent executive travel and competing priorities that can significantly delay review and result in missed local opportunities.

 

At the same, responsibility for any local review and approvals must be placed where approvers will not succumb to supervisor pressure to deploy risky agents, or where the elevation of any issue to more senior approvers is not thwarted.  In a decentralized model, corporate country directors may be more immune from these pressures, and local in-house corporate counsel can provide a solid complement to this local review.  The requirement of additional reviews, often at the central office, in higher risk circumstances can also undergird a local review structure, such as when proposed commission exceed 10%, certain commission thresholds could be attained (e.g. $100,000 or more),  the total sales opportunity for the company is extraordinary, or if operating in the most risky countries.   This sort of hybrid model can tap the best of both models.

 

Against these considerations, no one model fits all organizations.  The most effective system for an organization will be that which places the review and approval process where the most reliable information can be timely and effectively assessed, and the review decisions supported.”

 

 

We asked in-house counsel and compliance officers to provide examples of issues that arose during in-person training that might not have been uncovered through any other form of training.  Most of the examples involved very specific questions about the scope of a definition:  is an employee of a partly-state-owned entity a government official?  Do gifts provided publicly at contract signing events, after the business has been awarded, need to be scrutinized for FCPA implications?

 

What follows is another example, provided by Vince O’Connor, Vice President for FCPA Compliance at L-3 Communications Corporation.

 

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“When I was appointed as the Compliance and Ethics officer, one of the many goals set for me was to train all “gatekeepers” (those involved in foreign activities) on the FCPA. One issue arose repeatedly.  When it came to defining international consultants there was some confusion as to whether a U.S. company located in the U.S. should be considered an “International Consultant”.  This is true in spite of the fact that our Policy states that an International Consultant is: “A person, partnership, association, corporation or other organization located in the United States or abroad, that is retained by the company to provide professional or technical advice relating to the international sale of the company’s products and services, to provide professional or technical advice relating to investments made by L-3 abroad, or to otherwise interact with foreign governments, political parties or foreign candidates for political office on behalf of the company.”

 

One employee asked during training about a consultant that advised his team on how to conduct business in several foreign countries.  When asked if the consultant ever traveled on behalf of the company to foreign locations the answer was “yes”.  When questioned further it turned out that the consultant frequently traveled to foreign countries with senior company officials and the visits included meetings with foreign government officials. Because the consultant was with a company official, the employee did not consider the consultant to be acting on behalf of the company.  One of the many dangers in this analysis is that the consultant may go back to the same foreign official without a Company official present, creating an impression that the consultant is representing the Company.  In fact, his very presence at the initial meeting may be sufficient for the government official to consider him a spokesman for the Company.

 

This issue, which represents a possible gap in an otherwise robust compliance program, would not have come to my attention if the employees in question hadn’t had a chance to ask their questions in a live training forum.”

 

 

 

 

 

Many companies routinely require audit rights in their agreements with intermediaries, — and why not?  Audit rights strike most compliance professionals as a simple, low-cost process improvement that is easy to incorporate in contracts alongside standard FCPA language.  

  

But this decision deserves more attention than it usually gets.  Due diligence addresses the FCPA’s “knew or should have known” standard.   But with audit rights in place, doesn’t the universe of what companies “should have known” expand?  The additional burden shouldn’t be adopted lightly.

 

The companies we have asked fall into one of three categories on audit rights: (i) they don’t ask intermediaries for audit rights and they don’t want them; (ii) they include audit rights in their contracts, knowing that they can’t afford to exercise them; or (iii) they get audit rights with the unspoken (or, occasionally the explicit), understanding that the intermediary would never really permit the company to exercise them.  Only a handful of companies have audit rights and exercise them with any regularity.  So, what is worse from an FCPA compliance perspective – not having audit rights at all, or having audit rights and failing to exercise them?   And is it true that having them and failing to exercise them creates a bigger compliance problem than not having them at all?

 

At a recent International Corporate Compliance conference in Washington, an anti-corruption compliance panel wandered into a discussion over whether audit rights had become somewhat of a “false standard” in the FCPA compliance repertoire. 

 

A representative of the DOJ defended the audit rights standard, while acknowledging that their effectiveness depends on the resources a company has to enforce and exercise such rights.   According to the panelist, audit rights should not be overly burdensome to a company if they are only used after a triggering event occurs and then exercised in accordance with a specific scope.  Consistent with the general consensus on this issue, the panelists agreed that push back from an intermediary on the exercise of audit rights is a “red flag” in itself. 

 

But an intermediary could resist an audit for many reasons.  The great majority of third party intermediaries are relatively small entities.   They don’t keep segregated accounts for different principals and they can’t permit one principal to rifle through the records of another.

 

Many intermediaries are already convinced that US companies are overreaching with their invasive due diligence, their mandatory training and their ongoing monitoring.  They are likely to see audit rights as a further intrusion into their business.  A company can keep robust records without wanting to make them available to every company that asks to see them. 

 

Simply concluding that intermediaries “must have something to hide” if they don’t embrace your team of auditors may miss the business and cultural realities.

 

Demanding audit rights may sound like a better idea than it will prove to be in practice.  Before a company includes audit rights in its agreements, whether out of an abundance of caution, out of habit or simply out of vague good intentions, it makes sense to think through the consequences of having “rights” that may prove impractical, offensive or simply too costly to exercise.